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Note
Treating Adults Like Children: Re-Sentencing
Adult Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama
Brianna H. Boone*
At only fourteen, Kuntrell Jackson was sentenced to life
1
without parole. In 1999 Kuntrell and his friends agreed to rob
a video store, and on the way to the robbery Kuntrell’s friend
2
revealed that he was carrying a gun. During the robbery
3
Kuntrell’s friend shot and killed the storeowner. Kuntrell was
found liable on a felony-murder theory, which required a man4
datory minimum sentence of life without parole. Eventually, in
a 2012 opinion for Miller v. Alabama the Supreme Court held
that sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to life without parole is unconstitutional unless the sentencing court takes the
5
unique circumstances of youthfulness into account. The Supreme Court stressed that juveniles have transitory personali6
ties and should have an opportunity for reform. Now, as a result of Miller, Kuntrell Jackson could receive a lesser sentence
7
and one day be granted parole and released from prison. The
Arkansas Supreme Court granted Kuntrell Jackson the benefit
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School. I would
like to thank Professor Perry Moriearty for her assistance and support in this
Note. I would also like to thank Professors Jessica Clarke and Barbara Welke
for their encouragement and support. I thank Emily Bodtke for her willingness to listen and collaborate, as well as for her friendship. Finally, I would
like to thank Aaron Zaidman, Breena Boone, and my parents for their constant love and support. Copyright © 2015 by Brianna Boone.
1. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, ARK. DEP’T OF CORR., http://adc
.arkansas.gov/inmate_info/search.php?dcnum=128638&a=1&firstname=ku
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (providing information about Jackson’s age and sentence).
2. Jackson v. Arkansas, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004).
3. Id. at 759.
4. Id.; Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907–08 (Ark. 2013).
5. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
6. See id. at 2469.
7. See id. at 2475 (remanding both Miller’s and Jackson’s cases).
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of retroactive application of Miller, reopening his case and or8
dering a new sentencing trial. Several other states such as
Mississippi and Massachusetts have granted Jackson’s fellow
juvenile lifers the benefit of Miller, placing a mass of re9
sentencing trials on sentencing courts’ dockets.
10
Kuntrell is no longer fourteen though; he is a twenty-nine
year old man who spent his critical character-developing years
11
in prison, without any hope of freedom. Kuntrell no longer
carries the unique circumstances of youthfulness, because he is
12
no longer a child. His character has developed, and some factors the Supreme Court requires courts to consider when sen13
tencing juveniles to life without parole are no longer relevant.
Many other juvenile lifers throughout the country facing resentencing hearings are in this unusual situation along with
14
Kuntrell Jackson.
15
Miller fails to address this common paradox of taking
youthfulness into account when re-sentencing a juvenile lifer
16
who is no longer a juvenile. The Supreme Court simply states
that youthfulness must be taken into account during sentencing because juveniles have three unique characteristics: undeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to environmental

8. Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 909–10.
9. See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 275–
76 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–03 (Miss. 2013) (en banc).
10. Note that all references to the age of offenders are ages at the time of
this writing.
11. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, supra note 1.
12. See Jeffery Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469,
469 (2000) (arguing that the key development years for people run through the
mid-twenties).
13. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2466, 2469 (outlining the three most
important differences between adults and juveniles: lack of maturity, vulnerability, and transitory personality). For the argument that the “transitory personality” factor is no longer relevant to adult juvenile lifers, see infra Part
II.B.
14. See infra Part II.B.1 (pointing out examples of adult juvenile lifers
throughout the country).
15. See Ashby Jones, Life Sentences’ Blurred Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4,
2013, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
print/WSJ_-A003-20130904.pdf (stating that there were approximately 2,100
juvenile lifers sentenced pre-Miller).
16. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (remanding Miller’s and Jacksons’ cases for
further proceedings without explaining how evidence of their youthfulness
should matter in a re-sentencing hearing).
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17

influences, and lack of a defined character. It is unclear how
to take the third characteristic, often referred to as “transitory
18
personality,” into account during a re-sentencing hearing.
There is no longer a present interest in giving the juvenile offender a chance to reform his or her personality. This is a problem because Miller relies on this characteristic more heavily
19
than the others. In the cases following Miller no lower courts
20
have identified this problem. In Kuntrell Jackson’s case the
Arkansas Supreme Court simply granted him a re-sentencing
hearing where he can present “Miller evidence,” without describing how this evidence should be used in determining Jack21
son’s sentence.
This Note argues that it is paradoxical to re-sentence juvenile lifers who are now adults by taking youthfulness characteristics into account. It is moot for a court to determine that a
lower sentence than life without parole is warranted because of
the juvenile offender’s transitory personality when the offender
22
no longer has a transitory personality. This Note offers a solution for retroactively applying Miller to juvenile offenders who
are now adults without requiring complete re-sentencing hearings that look at crimes in a vacuum. Part I overviews the Supreme Court’s juvenile justice cases, the retroactivity doctrine,
and courts’ treatment of Miller’s retroactivity thus far. Part II
determines that Miller is retroactive, and discusses the problems inherent in re-sentencing juvenile lifers and/or offering
them parole. Part III proposes a “hybrid hearing” solution,
17. Id. at 2464, 2475 (“[Our] cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and
heedless risk-taking. Second, children ‘are more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers . . . .
And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are
‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005))).
18. See, e.g., id. at 2465, 2469 (using the terms “transient rashness” and
“transient immaturity” to describe an essential characteristic of juveniles).
19. See infra Parts I.B. and II.B.
20. A handful of lower courts have ordered re-sentencing hearings. See
infra Part I.C.
21. Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907, 910 (Ark. 2013) (“We also instruct that a sentencing hearing be held in the Mississippi County Circuit
Court where Jackson may present for consideration evidence that would include that of his ‘age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime.”
(quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475)).
22. See Arnett, supra note 12, at 469 (“For most people, the late teens
through the midtwenties are the most volitional years of life.”).
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which would allow courts to conduct hearings that are a mixture between sentencing and parole hearings. In “hybrid hearings,” courts would look at some of the “youthfulness” characteristics from Miller as related to the crime, but also the
offender’s current characteristics. This allows courts to address
the transitory personality characteristic ex-post, while avoiding
the problem a simple re-sentencing hearing presents when addressing this characteristic.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR RETROACTIVELY
APPLYING MILLER V. ALABAMA
The problem presented by Miller occurs at the intersection
of two areas of law: a presumption of lessened culpability for
23
juvenile offenders and the retroactivity doctrine. Understanding the evolution of both areas of law is necessary to properly
analyze retroactive application of Miller. Part A overviews the
Supreme Court’s juvenile justice cases. Part B of this section
provides background of the retroactivity doctrine. Part C explains how state and federal courts have interacted with Miller’s retroactivity thus far.
A. “YOUTHFULNESS” AND THE SUPREME COURT
Over the last decade the Supreme Court has issued a
steady stream of opinions requiring lessened culpability for ju24
veniles in criminal convictions. Although not formally known
as the “youthfulness” doctrine, the Court repeatedly references
important characteristics of youthfulness throughout these de25
cisions that are central to the Miller holding. Understanding
this trend of Supreme Court reasoning is necessary to fully understand what Miller requires in re-sentencing trials.
In a 1979 case, Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held
that there are three reasons children’s constitutional rights do
not equal adults’ rights: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) children’s inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner, and (3) the importance of the pa23. See generally Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Miller and Its Aftermath,
SENT’G L. & POL’Y, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
assessing-miller-and-its-aftermath (last updated Nov. 9, 2014) (following postMiller problems relating to juvenile justice and retroactivity).
24. See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 263–64 (2013).
25. See id. at 312–14.
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rental role in child rearing. This holding formally separated
adults’ and children’s constitutional rights, and although it did
not concern juvenile criminal conviction, the Court used this
27
reasoning in later juvenile criminal cases.
A few years after Bellotti, the Court held in Eddings v. Oklahoma that youthfulness is a relevant mitigating factor that a
sentencer cannot be precluded from considering during sen28
tencing. The Court reasoned that youthfulness is relevant
when mitigating sentences because “[i]t is a time and condition
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and
29
to psychological damage.” This is the first time the Court referenced the idea of lessened culpability in criminal convictions
30
because of youthfulness.
Over the last decade there have been four critical Supreme
Court opinions where the Court held particular sentences for
juvenile offenders constitute cruel and unusual punishment
31
and violate the Eighth Amendment. In Thompson v. Oklahoma a plurality held that sentencing juveniles under the age of
32
sixteen to death is cruel and unusual punishment. The Court
reasoned that a juvenile’s “[i]nexperience, less education, and
less intelligence” makes him or her less able to evaluate the
consequences of his or her actions’, and therefore death is too
severe a punishment, especially since it will not have a deter33
rence effect. The Court later extended this holding to all juveniles up to eighteen years old in a majority opinion for Roper v.
34
Simmons. Roper laid out three characteristics demonstrating
that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among the worst offenders”: (1) they lack maturity and are
35
more likely to have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,
(2) they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influ26. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–35, 637 (1979).
27. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982).
28. Id. at 115.
29. Id.
30. See id.; Feld, supra note 24, at 272.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
33. Id. at 835, 837.
34. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). In a case that fell between Thompson and Roper, the Court upheld the death penalty for sixteenor seventeen-year-old juveniles convicted of murder, acknowledging that juveniles have diminished culpability but rejecting a categorical ban of the sentence. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), overruled by Roper, 543
U.S. at 575.
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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36

ences and outsides pressures, and (3) their characters are not
37
as well-formed as an adult’s. The first two characteristics are
pulled from Bellotti and Eddings, and the last characteristic is
38
new to Roper.
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court went beyond the
death penalty, holding that subjecting non-homicide juvenile
offenders to life without parole violates the Eighth Amend39
ment. Graham emphasized that a life without parole sentence
for a juvenile offender assumes “that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society,” and that this assumption is
40
not founded in psychology and brain science. The Court
stressed that incorrigibility is inconsistent with the characteristics of juveniles, and that “juveniles are more capable of
change than are adults . . . their actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions
41
of adults.” The Court reasoned that since juveniles’ personalities are not fixed, a life without parole sentence for nonhomicide offenders is disproportionate because it denies juve42
niles “a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”
Most recently, in Miller the Court held that requiring
mandatory sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violates
43
the Eighth Amendment. The Court reiterated the three factors from Roper, and found that mandatory life without parole
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders precludes considera44
tion of these three factors. Similar to Graham, the Court
36. Id.
37. Id. at 570 (“The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory,
less fixed.”); see also Feld, supra note 24, at 277.
38. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–
16 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–35, 637 (1979).
39. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81–82 (2010). Graham is a complete
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders, so courts cannot sentence non-homicide juveniles to life without parole even after taking youthfulness into account. Feld, supra note 24, at 299.
40. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (“As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.”).
41. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
42. Id. at 72–73. The Court also points out that even though the state
claims Graham is incorrigible because of later prison misbehavior, a life without parole sentence was still disproportionate because the judgment of Graham’s incorrigibility was made at the outset, before he had chance to reform.
Id.
43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
44. Id. at 2468.
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stressed that mandatory life without parole for juveniles is disproportionate because it treats juveniles the same as adults,
45
without considering their differences. The punishment is also
disproportionate because it “disregards the possibility of reha46
bilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”
Since the Miller holding was only a categorical ban on
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders, and not a complete ban of the sentence (like in Roper
47
or Graham), courts can still sentence juvenile homicide offenders to life without parole after taking an offender’s “youth
48
and attendant circumstances” into account. A judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider a juvenile offender’s
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
49
consequences before issuing a life without parole sentence.
The Court points out that the instances when a court will still
find a juvenile deserves life without parole after taking youth50
fulness into account will be rare. The Court reasons that since
there is “great difficulty . . . distinguishing between . . .‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption,’” courts will unlikely find that juvenile
51
homicide offenders deserve life without parole.
B. THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s “retroactivity doctrine,” although a
52
53
has a volatile history.
relatively recent development,
Throughout its existence the doctrine has undergone substan-

45. Id. at 2466.
46. Id. at 2468.
47. Feld, supra note 24, at 272–73, 299.
48. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
49. Id. at 2468–69.
50. Id. at 2469 (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this
decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
51. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
52. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (holding for the
first time that there is no constitutional mandate to apply new rules of criminal procedure retroactively).
53. See generally Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus—Retroactivity of PostConviction Rulings: Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 975, 977–88 (1994) (providing a summary of all the changes the retroactivity doctrine has undergone).

BOONE_4fmt

1166

1/6/2015 3:10 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1159

54

tial changes several times, and some parts are still contest55
ed. Since the retroactivity doctrine is unstable, it is necessary
to track the evolution of the doctrine to understand its current
form, and how it applies to Miller.
Throughout most of the twentieth century the Court retroactively applied new constitutional rules to all cases on direct
review (cases on direct appeal) and collateral review (cases involving post-conviction challenges after direct appeals are ex56
hausted). Eventually, in 1965 the Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Linkletter v. Walker stating that there is no constitutional mandate to apply new constitutional rules retroactively,
and that the decision to apply a new rule retroactively is de57
termined by weighing several factors. This holding created the
58
retroactivity doctrine.
The Court did not distinguish between cases on direct and
collateral review, and subsequent cases used the Linkletter fac59
tors for both case types. Eventually, in a 1989 plurality opinion for Teague v. Lane the Supreme Court diverged from this
60
approach, adopting a new doctrine that requires new constitutional rules apply retroactively to cases on direct review, but
61
not to cases on collateral review. The Court found two exceptions to the non-retroactivity generally afforded collateral re62
view cases. The first exception allows retroactive application
of new substantive rules that “place[] ‘certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal

54. Id.
55. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358–59 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing about whether the retroactivity doctrine only applies
to determinations of convictions and not determinations of sentences).
56. Finley, supra note 53, at 977–78.
57. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629 (“[W]e must then weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation.”).
58. Finley, supra note 53, at 978.
59. See id.
60. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague plurality’s retroactivity doctrine was accepted by majorities throughout subsequent opinions, so
the doctrine is binding precedent. See Finley, supra note 53, at 982 (“In a series of Supreme Court cases, the major aspects of the plurality’s opinion in
Teague gained support from majorities of the Court.”).
61. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
62. Id. at 311–15.
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63

law-making authority to proscribe.’” The second exception allows retroactive application of “watershed” procedural rules
that implicate the fundamental fairness and the accuracy of the
64
conviction. If neither exception is met, new constitutional
rules are not retroactively applied to cases on collateral re65
view.
Although the retroactivity doctrine laid out in Teague represents the Court’s current retroactivity approach, the Court
has clarified and shifted certain aspects of the doctrine over
time. For example, the Court has clarified that substantive
rules not only include new rules that alter the range of conduct
the law punishes, but also classes of individuals the law pun66
ishes, such as juveniles. The Court has also defined and nar67
rowed the parameters of “watershed” procedural rules. The
Court has made it clear that the essential element of a watershed procedural rule is not that it implicates the fundamental
fairness of a conviction, but that it “so ‘seriously diminishe[s]’
accuracy that there is an ‘impermissibly large risk’ of punishing
68
conduct the law does not reach.” For example, in Schriro v.
Summerlin, the Court held that a new constitutional rule’s requirement that a jury, not a judge, must find an aggravating
circumstance necessary to impose the death penalty was not a
watershed procedural rule and should not be applied retroac69
tively. The Court stressed that even though evidence shows
63. Id. at 311 (holding that the “fair cross section requirement to the petit
jury” is not a substantive rule because it would not accord constitutional protection to any primary activity).
64. Id. at 311–12, 315 (“Because the absence of a fair cross section on the
jury venire does not undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a
conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, we conclude that a rule requiring that petit juries be composed of a fair
cross section of the community would not be a ‘bedrock procedural element’
that would be retroactively applied under the second exception we have articulated.”).
65. Id. at 311.
66. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 350, 353 (2004) (“A rule is
substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class
of persons that the law punishes.”).
67. Although this Note only highlights the confusion surrounding the definition of “watershed procedural rule,” the Court also struggled with simply
defining “new rule” in the cases following Teague. See Finley, supra note 53, at
981–88. The current accepted iteration defines “new rule” as a rule not dictated by precedent at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Whorton
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
68. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355–56 (alteration in original) (quoting Teague,
489 U.S. at 312–313).
69. Id. at 357–58.
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juries are more accurate fact-finders, a trial in which a judge
finds aggravating factors could not be so impermissibly inaccurate to require retroactive application of the new rule, and ul70
timately a new trial. As a result of the Court’s narrowing the
procedural rule exception, only one rule has ever satisfied the
71
exception: Gideon v. Wainwright’s requirement that indigent
72
defendants charged with felonies must be appointed counsel.
To clarify, in its current state the retroactivity doctrine
precludes retroactive application of new rules to cases on col73
lateral review unless the rule satisfies one of two exceptions.
If the new rule is substantive, for example it alters the class of
74
individuals the law punishes, then the rule is retroactive. If
the new rule is procedural it is only retroactive if the rule affects the accuracy of conviction and implicates the fundamental
fairness of a conviction, with more focus on accuracy than fair75
ness. Since the procedural rule exception is extremely narrow,
usually only new substantive rules retroactively apply to cases
76
on collateral review.
C. MILLER AND THE COURTS
When the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, twenty-eight states had sentencing schemes subjecting some juvenile homicide offenders to mandatory life without parole sen77
tences. There are now at least 2,100 juvenile homicide
78
offenders serving sentences of life without parole, and many
70. Id. at 356–57.
71. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
72. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419 (pointing to Gideon as the only procedural
rule meeting the exception). No procedural rules have passed the test since the
modern inception of the doctrine. See Tadhg Dooley, Whorton v. Bockting and
the Watershed Exception of Teague v. Lane, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=djclpp_sidebar (“Since the Teague
standard was announced, the Court has not found a single rule that satisfies
its requirements.”); see, e.g., Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418, 420 (holding that new
rule requiring cross-examination to admit prior testimonial statements of witness that have since become unavailable is not a watershed procedural rule).
73. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52.
74. Id. at 353.
75. See id. at 355–56.
76. See Dooley, supra note 72.
77. See Jones, supra note 15 (providing map that shows states with mandatory life without parole sentences).
78. Id.; see also Map: Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in the U.S.,
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map
.html (last updated May 21, 2009).
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state and federal courts must grapple with the retroactivity
79
doctrine and determine how Miller applies to these juveniles.
1. State Courts
Eleven state supreme courts have issued opinions concern80
ing Miller’s retroactivity. The courts’ treatment of Miller’s retroactivity varies widely, and there is no clear trend regarding
81
whether and how state courts will retroactively apply Miller.
In Jackson v. Norris, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied
Miller retroactively to a case on collateral review without deciding the retroactivity issue, remanding the defendant’s case to
the lower court for a new sentencing trial comporting with Mil82
ler. The court did not give detailed instructions for how the
lower court should conduct the re-sentencing hearing. The Arkansas court simply ordered a sentencing hearing in which the
defendant “may present . . . evidence that would include that of
83
his ‘age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime.’”
The highest courts in Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Illinois, and Texas applied Miller retroactively to
cases on collateral review after conducting full retroactivity
84
analyses. All six courts held that Miller created a new substantive rule, and is retroactive under the first Teague excep85
tion. Iowa and Nebraska reasoned that, even though Miller
looks like a procedural rule on the surface and has procedural
components, it is a substantive change in the law because it
86
categorically bans mandatory life without parole sentences.
Nebraska elaborated that Miller requires sentencers to consider new facts before sentencing juveniles to life without parole,
79. See infra Part II.B.
80. See infra notes 82–106 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907 (Ark. 2013).
83. Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012)).
84. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836
N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1
N.E.3d 270, 278–82 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss.
2013) (en banc); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 729–31 (Neb. 2014); Ex
parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
85. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115; Diatchenko, 1
N.E.3d at 278–82; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731; Ex
parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d at 75.
86. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 729–30 (“[T]he
Miller rule includes a substantive component. Miller did not simply change
what entity considered the same facts. And Miller did not simply announce a
rule that was designed to enhance accuracy in sentencing.”).

BOONE_4fmt

1170

1/6/2015 3:10 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1159

87

and is therefore substantive. Massachusetts and Mississippi
similarly reasoned that, because states cannot subject juveniles
to life without parole for all murder convictions, Miller created
88
a substantive change in the law. Nebraska was also persuaded by the fact that the Nebraska legislature had to change its
first-degree murder sentencing range for juveniles after Mil89
ler. The Iowa, Massachusetts, Illinois and Nebraska courts
additionally pointed out that since the Supreme Court remanded Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review, for
re-consideration after Miller, the Supreme Court wants Miller
90
to be retroactive.
Some of these courts slightly explained what they expect
91
out of new sentencing hearings. In Jones v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court required the lower court to consider all
circumstances from Miller before sentencing the defendant to
92
life without parole. In State v. Mantich, the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered re-sentencing according to a revised Nebraska sentencing statute, allowing the offender to submit evi93
dence relating to the youthfulness characteristics from Miller.
87. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 730 (“Effectively, then, Miller required a
sentencer of a juvenile to consider new facts, i.e., mitigation evidence, before
imposing a life imprisonment sentence with no possibility of parole. In our
view, this approaches what the Court itself held in Schriro would amount to a
new substantive rule: The Court made a certain fact (consideration of mitigating evidence) essential to imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.”).
88. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–82 (“The rule explicitly forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment – mandatory life in prison without
the possibility of parole – on a specific class of defendants: those individuals
under the age of eighteen when they commit the crime of murder.”); Jones, 122
So. 3d at 702 (“Following Miller, Mississippi’s current sentencing and parole
statutes could not be followed in homicide cases involving juvenile defendants.
Our sentencing scheme may be applied to juveniles only after applicable Miller characteristics and circumstances have been considered by the sentencing
authority. As such, Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its application for juveniles.”).
89. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731.
90. Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116; Diatchenko, 1
N.E.3d at 281–82.
91. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13, 122; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 703;
Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732. In Diatchenko, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court also determined that discretionary sentences of life without parole are
unconstitutional under state law, so the defendant’s sentence was automatically mitigated to life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years. 1 N.E.3d
at 286.
92. Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701 n.4.
93. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2)
(2013) (explicitly pointing to age at the time of the offense, impetuosity, family
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In Ex parte Maxwell, the highest court in Texas dictated that
the defendant cannot be sentenced to life without parole until
the sentencing court considers his “individual conduct, circum94
stances, and character.” In State v. Ragland, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a re-sentencing hearing already conduct95
ed by a district court. In the hearing, the defendant presented
evidence that he had a strong support network and a likely
chance for successful rehabilitation, and the district court mitigated his sentence to life with the possibility of parole after
96
twenty-five years.
Minnesota, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania held
97
that Miller is not retroactive. All four courts agreed that Mil98
ler handed down a “new rule,” but held that the rule is proce99
dural and not substantive. The courts reasoned that since Miller did not categorically ban life without parole sentences for
100
juveniles, it is a procedural rule. As further evidence that the
rule is procedural rather than substantive, Louisiana and Minnesota pointed out that Miller did not create a new element for
101
juvenile homicide conviction.

and community environment, ability to appreciate risks and consequences of
the conduct, intellectual capacity, and mental health evaluation as mitigating
factors the court can consider).
94. Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
95. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122.
96. Id. at 112–13. The defendant had already served for twenty-five years,
so he was eligible for parole immediately. Id. at 113.
97. See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013); People v. Carp, 852
N.W.2d 801, 827–28 (Mich. 2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331
(Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013). The
Louisiana Supreme Court determined Miller is not retroactive despite previously applying Miller retroactively to two cases that came before it on collateral review. See State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28, 28 (La. 2012) (per curiam);
State v. Graham, 99 So. 3d 28, 29 (La. 2012).
98. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 831; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 820; Chambers, 831
N.W.2d at 326; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
99. Tate, 130 So. 3d at 831; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 825; Chambers, 831
N.W.2d at 328; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
100. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 837 (“[Miller] simply altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole . . . .”); Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 825; Chambers, 831
N.W.2d at 328; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“Since, by its own terms, the Miller holding ‘does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders,’ it is
procedural and not substantive for purposes of Teague.”).
101. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 837 (“[Miller] did not alter the elements necessary for a homicide conviction.”); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 329.
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All four courts also held that Miller is not a watershed pro102
cedural rule. The courts reasoned that requiring presentation
of youthfulness characteristics before handing out severe sentences to juveniles is a well-established principle, and Miller is
103
simply an outgrowth of previous juvenile justice cases. The
courts also determined that Miller does not rise to the level of
104
Gideon, the case that announced the procedural rule change
105
the Supreme Court has dubbed “watershed.” Pennsylvania
additionally pointed out that a majority of Supreme Court justices would not agree that Miller is a watershed procedural
106
rule.
2. Federal Courts
Four federal circuit courts have addressed Miller’s retroac107
tivity in some capacity. Similar to the state courts, there is no
108
consensus among the federal courts about this issue.
The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits all allowed defendants to file successive motions based on Miller because the defendants made prima facie showings that Miller is retroac109
Although none of the courts fully analyzed Miller’s
tive.
retroactivity, and left it to district courts to determine, they
110
seem to agree that Miller should be retroactive.
102. See Tate, 130 So. 3d at 839–41; Carp, 852 N.W.2d at 826; Chambers,
831 N.W.2d at 330–31; Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10.
103. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So. 3d at 835–36; Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331.
104. See, e.g., Tate, 130 So. 3d at 841 (“[W]e find [Miller] cannot be construed to qualify as being ‘in the same category with Gideon’ in having ‘effected a profound and “sweeping” change.’”); Chambers, 831 N.W.2d at 331; Cunningham, A.3d at 10.
105. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007).
106. See Cunningham, 81 A.3d at 10 (“We doubt, however, that a majority
of the Justices would broaden the [procedural rule] exception beyond the exceedingly narrow (or, essentially, class-of-one) parameters reflected in the line
of decisions referenced by the Commonwealth.”).
107. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam);
In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Johnson v.
United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720–21 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013
WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013).
108. Compare In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371 (stating that the defendant has made a prima facie case of retroactivity), and In re Pendleton, 732
F.3d at 282 (same), and Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721 (same), with In re Morgan,
713 F.3d at 1368 (denying retroactivity of Miller), and Craig, 2013 WL 69128,
at *2 (same).
109. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371–72; In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d
at 282; Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721.
110. See In re Simpson, 555 F. App’x. at 371; In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d at
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111

Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits held that Miller is
112
not retroactive. The Eleventh Circuit denied a defendant
permission to file a successive motion based on Miller because
113
it reasoned that Miller is not a new substantive rule. The
Fifth Circuit, giving the most in-depth analysis of Miller’s retroactivity of all the federal courts, held, in an unpublished opinion, that Miller is not substantive because it is not a categorical
114
bar on life without parole. The Fifth Circuit also held that
Miller is not a watershed procedural rule because it is an outgrowth of prior opinions pertaining to individual sentencing for
115
juveniles.
3. United States Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed
Miller’s retroactivity, it has made decisions some courts and
commentators believe signal the Court’s favorable position on
Miller’s retroactivity. In issuing Miller the court also remanded
116
Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review.
Some courts and commentators have used this as evidence that
117
Miller is retroactive. Also, shortly after the Miller decision, in
Mauricio v. California (Mauricio received a discretionary life
without parole sentence and argued that the trial court failed
118
to properly balance all relevant factors during sentencing) the
Court issued an order granting certiorari, vacating the lower
119
decision, and remanding the case to a lower court (GVR) for
282; Johnson, 720 F.3d at 721.
111. The Fifth Circuit has issued split opinions on this issue.
112. See In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368; Craig, 2013 WL 69128, at *2.
113. In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368.
114. Craig, 2013 WL at 69128, *1–2.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (reversing both Jackson’s and Miller’s cases).
117. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Iowa 2013); Marsha
L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson:
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369,
380 (2013) (“The Court’s application of its holding in Miller to Jackson’s case
necessarily dictates retroactivity of the new rule.”). But see People v. Carp, 828
N.W.2d 685, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that the new hearing granted
to Jackson does not matter because retroactivity was not an issue before the
Court), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014).
118. Lyle Denniston, A Puzzle on Juvenile Sentencing, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
16, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/a-puzzle-on-juvenile
-sentencing.
119. A GVR order is an order issued by the Supreme Court that grants a
petition for certiorari, vacates the decision of the court bellow, and remands
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“further consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama.” One
commentator argues that even though Mauricio is not a mandatory life without parole case the GVR suggests the Court is
“inviting lower courts to tinker with the notion that Miller has
121
a substantive bite.”
Despite certain Supreme Court moves pointing to a possible pro-retroactivity ruling in the future, Miller’s retroactivity
122
remains undetermined. There is widespread disagreement
among courts concerning Miller’s retroactivity, many holding
that Miller creates a new substantive rule and is therefore ret123
roactive, and many others holding that Miller creates a pro124
cedural rule that fails the retroactivity test. Additionally,
those courts applying Miller retroactively have not definitively
determined how to implement Miller’s youthfulness character125
istics during new sentencing hearings. Juvenile lifers’ postMiller statuses are inconsistent and will likely be settled by the
126
Supreme Court at a future date.

the case for further proceedings—usually in light of an intervening new law or
fact. Sena Ku, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: Drawing a Line Between Deference and Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2008).
120. Mauricio v. California, 133 S. Ct. 524, 524 (2012).
121. Alexander Satanovsky, Habeas Corpus - Alex’s First Post, HABEAS
CORPUS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_
corpus_blog/2012/10/habeas-corpus-alexs-first-post.html (“The GVR strongly
suggests that Miller may in fact be more than a procedural rule . . . but rather
a substantive restriction . . . .”).
122. The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for any Miller retroactivity cases at the time of this writing.
123. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013); Diatchenko v.
Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 279, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State,
122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (en banc); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010,
1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
124. See In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain,
No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013); State v. Tate,
130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331
(Minn. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013); Geter
v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); People v. Carp, 828
N.W.2d 685, 713 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 801 (Mich. 2014).
125. See Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910–11 (Ark. 2013); Ragland,
836 N.W.2d at 115; Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702;
Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022.
126. See Douglas A. Berman & Robert J. Watkins, Third Circuit Concludes
Juves Serving LWOP Made “Prima Facie Showing that Miller Is Retroactive,”
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Oct. 4, 2013), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
law_and_policy/2013/week40/index.html (“Because of the circuit split noted by
the Third Circuit . . . the Supreme Court is surely likely to take up this issue
in some form at some point in the not too distant future.”).
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II. GIVING JUVENILE LIFERS THE BENEFIT OF MILLER
V. ALABAMA
Granting juvenile lifers post-Miller justice requires a finding that Miller is retroactive, and developing a practical method to re-sentence these offenders. Section A of this Part critiques some state courts’ conclusions that Miller is not
retroactive, and determines that Miller should be considered
retroactive. Section B explains that retroactively applying Miller creates a paradox of treating adults like children, because
transitory personality is a foundational principle in Miller that
is irrelevant to adult juvenile lifers. Section B also analyzes
courts’ and legislatures’ current efforts to apply Miller retroactively, and concludes that none of these efforts solve the paradox. Section C addresses potential problems juvenile lifers will
face in parole hearings, whether they arrive at the hearing via
re-sentencing or an automatic lesser sentence.
A. RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS
Before examining how to retroactively apply Miller to juvenile lifers, it is necessary to determine if Miller is retroactive
for cases on collateral review. Based on Teague, if Miller cre127
ates a substantive rule, then it is retroactive. Additionally, if
Miller creates a “watershed” procedural rule that implicates
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of juvenile lifers’ convic128
tions (with more emphasis on accuracy), then it is retroac129
tive. If Miller does not fall into either category, then it is not
130
retroactive for cases on collateral review.
1. Miller Creates a New Substantive Rule
If Miller is retroactive it will likely be because it creates
a new substantive rule, because the Supreme Court has not
131
held any new procedural rules pass the test. It is likely that
the Supreme Court would find Miller creates a new substantive
rule, despite the fact that it does not place a categorical ban on
life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.
First, Miller “alters the . . . class of persons that the law pun-

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1988).
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355–56 (2004).
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12, 315.
See id. at 311.
See Dooley, supra note 72.
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132

ishes,” which is one way a new rule qualifies as substantive.
Miller precludes the law from imposing mandatory life without
133
parole sentences on juvenile offenders. The law can still im134
pose mandatory life without parole on adult offenders, therefore Miller simply limits the class of persons subject to manda135
tory life without parole.
Second, even though several courts have ruled that Miller
136
does not create a new substantive rule, it is because they
failed to separate a mandatory life without parole sentence
from a sentencing range where life without parole is the maximum after considering youthfulness characteristics. Even
though one could argue (and courts have) that the only difference between these two sentencing ranges is that one requires
a different procedure (considering youthfulness characteristics)
137
before imposing life without parole on a juvenile, the difference is not procedural. The second range forces the sentencing
judge to consider other possible sentences as well—life without
parole is not the juvenile’s only option. This is a substantive
difference. Miller creates a substantive rule that requires more
sentencing options than life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.
2. Miller Could Be a Watershed Procedural Rule
If the Supreme Court ever rules on Miller’s retroactivity,
and decides Miller does not create a substantive rule, it is possible the Court would find Miller is the first modern example of
a “watershed” procedural” rule. In Schriro v. Summerlin, the
Court ruled that having a jury, not a judge, find the presence of
an aggravating circumstance necessary for the death penalty is
not a watershed procedural rule because it does not cut to the
138
accuracy of a death sentence. The rule declared in Miller is
132. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353. The Supreme Court applies this reasoning to
both convictions and punishments. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–
30 (1989) (“Therefore, the first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense.”).
133. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Levick & Schwartz, supra 117, at 386 (arguing that Miller
creates a substantive rule).
136. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v.
Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013).
137. See Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–30 (Minn. 2013).
138. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 357 (2004).
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distinguishable because it almost certainly could affect the ac139
curacy of a particular sentence. Miller requires consideration
of many differences between juveniles and adults that could affect a judge’s determination of a juvenile offender’s culpabil140
ity. In addition, when comparing the requirement from Gide141
on v. Wainwright that criminal offenders receive counsel (the
142
only accepted watershed procedural rule), with the requirement of considering youthfulness when sentencing juvenile
homicide offenders, both rules carry significant importance, es143
pecially when compared with the rule considered in Schriro.
The rule at issue in Schriro simply shifts the fact-finding responsibility from judge to jury, whereas Gideon and Miller add
a completely new element into the process—in one case an at144
torney and in the other, consideration of youthfulness.
3. Miller Is Retroactive
Whether the Supreme Court eventually finds that Miller is
a new substantive rule or a watershed procedural rule, it is
likely that the Court will find a way to make Miller retroactive.
The Court remanded Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on col145
lateral review, for re-consideration in light of Miller. This
move strongly suggests that the Court feels juvenile lifers previously sentenced to mandatory life without parole should have
new sentencing hearings where their youthfulness is taken into
146
account. Additionally, the Court’s issuance of a GVR for a
case on collateral review (although not a mandatory life without parole case), requiring the lower court to consider the case

139. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller strongly supports this inference. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (stating that sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders will be rare once judges take youthfulness into account).
140. Id.
141. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
142. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007).
143. See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 357.
144. Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475, and Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344, with
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 357. The Nebraska Supreme Court also agrees that the
Miller rule is more significant than the rule considered in Schriro. See State v.
Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 730 & n.94 (2014) (stating that “Miller did not
simply change what entity considered the same facts,” in reference to Ring,
the rule considered in Schriro).
145. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (reversing both Jackson’s and Miller’s cases).
146. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 392.
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in light of Miller, suggests that the Court believes the princi147
ples from Miller are retroactive on collateral review.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court may never rule on Miller’s retroactivity, and leave it to lower courts to determine retroactivity for themselves. In that case, Miller will certainly be
retroactive in at least some jurisdictions, and those courts will
148
have to figure out how to apply Miller retroactively. Even if
the Supreme Court rules that Miller is not retroactive, states
currently applying Miller retroactively can and will continue to
149
do so. One way or another, Miller will be retroactive in at
150
least some jurisdictions.
B. RE-SENTENCING JUVENILE LIFERS: THE PARADOX OF
151
TREATING ADULTS LIKE CHILDREN
Since Miller is retroactive in at least some jurisdictions,
and, as previously argued, should be retroactive nationwide,
courts must determine how to resentence juvenile lifers. This is
a new problem courts face in juvenile criminal cases because
although previous Supreme Court juvenile justice cases cate152
gorically banned certain sentences, Miller requires courts to
153
broaden the scope of possible sentences. After previous juvenile justice rulings courts could simply commute the affected
juvenile offenders’ sentences to the next lowest offense. For example, after Roper courts could commute juvenile death sen154
tences to life without parole. Similarly, after Graham courts
could commute non-homicide juvenile offender life without pa147. See Mauricio v. California, 133 S. Ct. 524, 524 (2012); see also
Satanovsky, supra note 121.
148. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–17 (Iowa 2013); Jones
v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss. 2013) (en banc).
149. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 551 U.S. 264, 291 (2008) (“A decision by
this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not
imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of
trial–only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts.”).
150. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115–17; Jones, 102 So. 3d at 701–02.
151. “Treating adults like children” is an inversion of a phrase Marsha
Levick uses when describing the many paradoxes of treating juvenile lifers
like adults. Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394.
152. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2011) (issuing a
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (issuing a categorical
ban on death sentences for juveniles).
153. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
154. See Tamar Birckhead, Should Miller v. Alabama Be Applied Retroactively?, JUV. JUST. BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012), http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc
.edu/2012/08/15/should-miller-v-alabama-be-applied-retroactively.
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155

role sentences to life with the possibility of parole. Miller, on
the other hand, does not preclude courts from sentencing juveniles to life without parole; it requires courts to consider
“youthfulness” characteristics before sentencing juveniles to life
156
without parole. This makes re-sentencing juvenile lifers much
more complicated than simply commuting their sentences.
157
Other than just requiring more work for lower courts,
considering “youthfulness” characteristics when re-sentencing
juvenile lifers could be moot, because many of these individuals
are no longer juveniles. In Miller, the Court lists several factors
courts should consider when sentencing juveniles: family and
home environment; extent of participation in the offense, and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected the juvenile; the offender’s possible inability to deal with police offic158
ers or prosecutors; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The
Miller court especially stresses the final factor, possibility of
159
rehabilitation, throughout its entire opinion. The fact that juveniles’ unique characteristics are not permanent is a main jus160
tification for treating juveniles differently. The Court stresses
that because juveniles can change, courts should not mandatorily subject juveniles to punishments that foreclose a chance to
161
change. The Court’s main justification for concluding that after Miller life without parole sentences will be “rare,” is that a
juvenile offender’s crime does not reflect “irreparable corrup162
tion,” but rather “transient immaturity.” The Court suggests
that if sentencers could tell which juveniles are actually just
“bad seeds,” harsh punishments such as life without parole
163
would be justified for those juveniles.

155. Id.
156. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
157. Cf. Feld, supra note 24, at 316, 319–20 (describing how Miller did not
leave judges and parole boards with practical guidance of how to consider
youthfulness in trials and arguing that a categorical rule of reduced punishments for juveniles is more workable).
158. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
159. See id. at 2464, 2468–69.
160. See id. at 2464 (listing transitory personality as one of “three significant gaps” that Graham, Roper, and ultimately Miller rely on to establish that
juveniles are less deserving of overly severe punishments, such as death or life
without parole); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–68, 73 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
161. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
162. Id. at 2469.
163. See id.
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Many juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to mandatory
164
life without parole are no longer juveniles. For example,
165
Kuntrell Jackson, sentenced at fourteen, is now twenty-nine.
Adult juvenile-lifers’ personalities are now for the most part
166
fixed. Although some psychologists disagree that personali167
ties become fixed at any point in life, the general consensus
throughout the twentieth century was that people’s personali168
The
ties become fixed somewhere around turning thirty.
Court also seems to accept the theory that people’s personalities become fixed at some point, since transitory personality is
one of its three main justifications for subjecting juvenile of169
fenders to less harsh punishments than adults. With this
knowledge, it is unclear how a court could re-sentence a juvenile lifer using youthfulness characteristics that are primarily
justified based on transitory personalities in juveniles when the
juvenile lifer no longer has a transitory personality. The court
will, theoretically, now know whether the juvenile lifer is
170
plagued with “irreparable corruption.”
This paradox of re-sentencing adult juvenile lifers with
youthfulness characteristics creates a problem. Juvenile lifers
are still entitled to the justice Miller affords them, but complete
re-sentencing hearings examining the offenders’ crime in a
vacuum may lead to absurd results. For example, one could envision a situation in which a juvenile lifer’s crime was extremely depraved and, despite youthfulness characteristics, worthy of
life without parole, but his current, adult behavior demon164. See, e.g., Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Juvenile Sentences, PEW (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research
-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-acton-juvenile-sentences (discussing juvenile lifer Henry Hill, who is now forty);
Jones, supra note 15 (discussing juvenile lifer Jeffrey Ragland, who is now forty-five).
165. Inmate Details of Kuntrell Jackson, supra note 1.
166. See Antonio Terracciano et al., Personality Plasticity After Age 30, 32
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 999, 999, 1007 (2006) (finding that the
study strengthens claims of predominant personality stability after age 30).
167. See, e.g., Sanjay Srivastava et al., Development of Personality in Early
and Middle Adulthood: Set Like Plaster or Persistent Change?, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1041, 1051 (2003) (“Mean levels of personality traits
changed gradually but systematically throughout the life span, sometimes
more after age 30 than before.”).
168. See generally id. at 1042 (providing an overview of the widely accepted
“plaster theory,” which postulates that personality traits reach maturity by
age thirty).
169. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
170. Id. at 2469.
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strates maturity and reform. It would be absurd to re-sentence
this offender to life without parole based on a transitory personality theory (in this case concluding that the offender in fact
has a depraved personality) when we know he has grown into
171
an upright, respectable individual.
1. New Sentencing Trial
Lower courts are granting juvenile lifers retroactive application of Miller, and many juvenile lifers will receive new sen172
tencing hearings as a result. No court has addressed the
problem of implementing Miller’s holding to adult juvenile173
lifers.
In State v. Simmons, the Louisiana Supreme Court instructed the district court to reconsider a juvenile’s life without
parole sentence “after conducting a sentencing hearing in ac174
cord with the principles enunciated in Miller.” Because a ju175
venile’s transitory personality is a bedrock principle in Miller,
it would follow that the Louisiana Supreme Court expects lower
courts to address this characteristic in sentencing hearings.
The court provided no guidance, however, about how this prin176
ciple applies to an offender who is now thirty-six years old.
In Jones v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court set forth
similar instructions, requiring the lower court to conduct a new

171. Another example of an absurd result: A juvenile lifer was heavily influenced by his peers to participate in a robbery that ended up in the murder
of a bystander. The juvenile lifer was subject to mandatory life without parole.
The juvenile lifer, now an adult, is constantly involved in extremely violent
acts in prison which suggest that he should not have the opportunity for release. Based on Miller, the juvenile lifer is likely eligible to receive a lower
sentence for his crime, but his current actions do not support a lower sentence.
172. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Ark. 2013); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013); State v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28, 28
(La. 2012) (per curiam); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 701–02 (Miss. 2013)
(en banc); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d
1010, 1022–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
173. See, e.g., Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 910; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122;
Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28; Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701–02; Mantich, 842 N.W.2d
at 732; Williams, 982 N.E.2d at 199; Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022.
174. Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28.
175. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (listing transitory
personality as one of “three significant gaps” that Graham, Roper, and ultimately Miller rely on to establish that juveniles are less deserving of overly
severe punishments, such as death or life without parole).
176. Simmons, 99 So. 3d at 28 (stating that Simmons was seventeen when
he committed his crime in 1995).
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sentencing hearing in which it considers “all circumstances set
177
forth in Miller.” Like Louisiana, it would follow that the Mississippi Supreme Court expects transitory personality to be
considered in this sentencing hearing, but there is no explanation about how to apply this characteristic to a twenty-five178
year-old. In this case, the Mississippi Supreme Court actually
declined a request from the juvenile lifer’s attorneys that the
court clarify what it “intends to happen when [the offender’s]
179
case goes back to [the lower court] for re-sentencing.”
In State v. Mantich, the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered
re-sentencing comporting with a revised Nebraska sentencing
180
statute. Although the Nebraska court provided more struc181
tured instructions by virtue of pointing to a statute, the court
did not explain how this statute should apply to current juve182
nile lifers versus new juvenile offenders. Since the court made
no distinction between offenders being re-sentenced, and offenders being sentenced for the first time, it is fair to assume
that Nebraska expects re-sentencing hearings to consider all
Miller youthfulness factors, including transitory personality,
183
the same way it would for new offenders. It is unclear how
this analysis would work when re-sentencing a thirty-six-year184
old who has spent twenty years in prison.

177. Jones, 122 So. 3d at 701 n.4. The Arkansas Supreme Court has also
issued an opinion setting forth instructions similar to those in Simmons and
Jones. See Norris, 426 S.W.3d at 907 (requiring a sentencing hearing in which
the defendant “may present . . . evidence that would include that of his ‘age,
age-related characteristics, and the nature of’ his crime”).
178. See Jones, 122 So. 3d. at 701 n.4, 702; Patsy R. Brumfield, Court Denies Rehearing for Brett Jones, NE. MISS. DAILY J. (Sep. 27, 2013),
http://djournal.com/news/update-court-denies-brett-jones-hearing
-sentenc-questions (stating that Jones was twenty-four in September, 2013).
179. The Sun Herald, Court Denies Rehearing for Brett Jones, MISS. ST.
NEWS (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.mississippi.statenews.net/index.php/
sid/217384530/scat/a97a4109a449ff84; see also Brumfield, supra note 178.
180. State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731–32 (Neb. 2014).
181. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2) (2013) (providing examples of factors courts can look at in sentencing).
182. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 732.
183. Even though the statute governing Mantich’s re-sentencing hearing
does not list transitory personality as a factor, the statute is not limited to the
factors listed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02(2). Since, as explained, transitory
personality is a bedrock principle in Miller v. Alabama, Nebraska would expect this factor to be considered when retroactively applying Miller. See supra
note 175 and accompanying text.
184. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 718–19 (stating that Mantich was sixteen in
1994 when the murder took place).
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The Iowa Supreme Court is the only court that has articulated a clear set of expectations for re-sentencing hearings
based on Miller. In State v. Ragland, the court affirmed a district court’s re-sentencing hearing of a juvenile lifer, stating
that the court “properly resentenced Ragland in light of Mil185
ler.” The district court re-sentencing hearing included testi186
mony from Ragland’s friends and family. A business owner
testified that he would give Ragland a job upon release, and
Ragland’s brother testified that he would give Ragland a place
to live and had developed a relationship with the victim’s
187
brother. Additionally, one of Ragland’s accomplices testified,
188
claiming that Ragland was minimally involved in the murder.
After hearing this evidence, the district court re-sentenced
Ragland to life with the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years—which incidentally made Ragland immediately
189
eligible for parole.
This district court reasoning, which the Iowa Supreme
Court accepted, provides the most guidance thus far on how to
adequately re-sentence juvenile lifers. Although the district
court’s method is workable, it does not follow Miller exactly, be190
cause the court did not consider all Miller evidence. For example, the court excluded discussion of Ragland’s transitory
personality, and only minimally included other youthfulness
characteristics such as impulsivity, immaturity, and environ191
mental factors. The court focused more on Ragland’s character at the moment of re-sentencing, and less on his youthful192
ness characteristics at the time the crime was committed.
There was little discussion of whether Ragland, at the time he
committed the crime and because of the nature of the crime,

185. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 122 (Iowa 2013).
186. Id. at 112.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 112–13.
190. Compare Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (listing relevant factors in sentencing a juvenile: family and home environment; extent of
participation in the offense and the way peer pressure may have affected him;
the offender’s possible inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors; and
the possibility of rehabilitation), with Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13 (looking
at family and home environment, maturity, and relationship with the victim
in the present, not at the time of the crime).
191. Ragland’s accomplice briefly discusses the group of boys’ poor home
lives and immaturity. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112.
192. Id. at 112–13.
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193

deserved life without parole. The court stated that the governor’s previous commutation of Ragland’s sentence to life with
the possibility of parole after serving sixty years was not adequate under Miller because it “deprived Ragland of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate his maturity and rehabilita194
tion.” This declaration further establishes that the court was
focused on Ragland’s current personality, rather than youthfulness characteristics at the time of the crime. Even though
the district court’s re-sentencing hearing was practical and
brought justice for Ragland, it did not properly implement Miller and looks more like a parole hearing than a sentencing
195
hearing.
2. Automatic Lesser Sentence
The paradox of treating adults like children when implementing Miller during re-sentencing hearings is avoidable if
states completely preclude life without parole for juveniles. In
that situation, if Miller is retroactive courts could automatically commute juvenile lifers’ sentences to the next lowest sen196
197
tence. Several states are taking this route.
Wyoming, a state that imposed mandatory life without parole for some juvenile homicide offenders before Miller, has
changed its sentencing laws to preclude discretionary life with198
out parole sentences for juvenile offenders. Wyoming now
sentences juveniles convicted of first-degree murder to life im193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Parole hearings typically consider factors almost identical to those
considered in Ragland’s hearing. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013) (stating that
parole hearings should consider offender’s chances of recidivism upon release,
and should encourage persons interested in prisoner to testify); Lifer Parole
Process, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/
lifer_parole_process.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (listing factors to consider
in parole, including “plans for the future”).
196. See Birckhead, supra note 154; Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at
389 (“If state law already provides for an alternative term of years or life sentence with the possibility of parole, the sentencer can likely impose one of
those options . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., H.R. 0023, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013);
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283–85 (Mass. 2013);
Associated Press, Juveniles Convicted of Murder Must Get Parole Chance in
Mich., THE BLADE (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/Courts/2013/
08/13/Juveniles-convicted-of-murder-must-get-parole-chance-in-Mich.html;
Hawaii Becomes Latest State To Abolish Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (July 7, 2014), http://www.eji.org/node/924.
198. Wyo. H.R. 0023.

BOONE_4fmt

2015]

1/6/2015 3:10 PM

RE-SENTENCING JUVENILE LIFERS

1185

prisonment with the possibility of parole after serving twenty199
five years. If Wyoming applies Miller retroactively, or the Supreme Court eventually rules that Miller is retroactive, Wyoming could simply commute all current juvenile lifers’ sentences to life with the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five
200
years.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that any life without parole sentences for juveniles—discretionary or mandato201
ry—violate state constitutional law. The Massachusetts rul202
ing is retroactive, so all juvenile lifers will automatically have
203
their sentences commuted to the next lowest sentence. Currently, life with the possibility of parole after fifteen years is
204
the next lowest sentence, but the Massachusetts legislature is
considering legislation requiring juvenile murderers to serve at
205
least thirty-five years.
In Michigan, a U.S. District Court judge issued an order
requiring Michigan to grant parole consideration to any juve206
niles convicted of murder. The judge’s ruling essentially precludes life without parole sentences for any juvenile offenders
207
in Michigan. Even though the Michigan Supreme Court has
208
held that Miller does not apply retroactively, if the United
States Supreme Court holds that Miller is retroactive, Michi199. Id.
200. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 389.
201. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 283–85.
202. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 262–63 (Mass. 2013).
203. Id. In Diatchenko, the juvenile lifer was automatically granted parole
consideration since he had been serving for thirty-one years. 1 N.E.3d at 286.
204. Sarah Schweitzer & Michael Levenson, Mass. SJC Bars No-Parole
Life Terms for Youths, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe
.com/metro/2013/12/24/mass-high-court-strikes-down-life-without-parole
-sentences-for-juveniles/eyjKrVSE2EXD0KF7wQXX5M/story.html.
205. Milton J. Valencia, Bill Seeks at Least 35 Years for Young Killers, BOS.
GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/01/24/
legislators-propose-parole-hearings-for-juvenile-murderers-only-after-they
-have-served-years-prison/Dis1vi9GEqBgt9BovNmQ4I/story.html.
206. See Associated Press, supra note 197; Kate Abbey-Lambertz & Ashley
Woods, Michigan Juvenile Life Without Parole Mandatory Sentencing Ban
Upheld by Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/michigan-juvenile-life-without-parole
-sentencing_n_3756853.html; Jonathan Oosting, Federal Judge Says All Michigan ‘Juvenile Lifers’ Eligible for Parole; Bill Schuette Disagrees, MLIVE (Aug.
13,
2013),
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/08/federal_judge_
every_juvenile_l.html.
207. If all juvenile lifers receive parole consideration, then they technically
are not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
208. People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 827–28 (Mich. 2014).
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gan could commute all juvenile lifers’ sentences to allow parole
209
consideration.
Although Wyoming, Massachusetts, and Michigan have
easy solutions for retroactively applying Miller because they all
preclude life without parole for juveniles, this is not the case for
most states that imposed mandatory life without parole on ju210
venile homicide offenders pre-Miller. Many states changed
their laws to comply with Miller but still allow discretionary
life without parole sentences for some juvenile homicide offend211
ers after considering Miller’s youthfulness characteristics. In
these cases, juvenile lifers need complete re-sentencing hearings to determine if life without parole is still justified in light
of the Miller factors, and courts must solve the paradox of
212
treating adults like children.
C. THE PROBLEM OF PAROLE
Whether through a new sentencing hearing or an automatic lesser sentence, at least some adult juvenile-lifers will soon
213
face parole boards. Some scholars suggest that juvenile lifers
209. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 389. It should be noted that
Michigan is considering legislation that would retain a life without parole sentence, and the district court case requiring parole consideration for all juvenile
lifers is on appeal. Associated Press, Mich. House OKs Sentencing Rules for
Young Killers, CBS DETROIT (Feb. 5, 2014), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2014/
02/05/mich-house-oks-sentencing-rules-for-young-killers. If the legislation
passes and/or the case is reversed, Michigan would face the same resentencing problems as other states. See supra Part II.B.1.
210. See Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Juvenile
Sentences, PEW (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and
-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-act-onjuvenile-sentences (“[T]here are at least 15 states that have not yet eliminated
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.”); How Many People Are
Serving in My State?, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH,
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/reports-and-research/how-many-people-are
-serving-in-my-state (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (breaking down which states
still allow life without parole); James Swift, Miller v. Alabama: One Year Later, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (June 25, 2013), http://jjie.org/miller-v
-alabama-one-year-later (stating that at least seven states have kept life without parole as a possible sentence for juvenile homicide offenders).
211. See, e.g., S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Ass. (Del. 2013) (removing mandatory life
without parole, but retaining life without parole as a maximum sentence for
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder); S.B. 228, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Utah
2013) (making aggravated murder committed by a juvenile a noncapital first
degree felony punishable under section 76-3-207.7 of the Utah Criminal Code);
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (2012) (naming life without parole as a
possible punishment for juveniles convicted of noncapital first degree felonies).
212. See supra Part II.B.1.
213. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 112–13, 122 (Iowa 2013).
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facing parole boards could be problematic, because juvenile offenders serving long sentences are more likely to have adverse
214
prison experiences.
Juvenile offenders serving long sentences are often imme215
diately sent to prison with adult offenders. These juvenile
prisoners face the same prison challenges that adult offenders
face, but because they are juveniles, they lack the mental or
216
physical ability to adjust to prison life. Since juveniles are
less emotionally well adjusted, juvenile lifers often “use vio217
lence to express anger or to protect themselves.” Additionally,
juvenile lifers typically receive fewer rehabilitative services
than prisoners with shorter sentences, and once they turn
eighteen “[they] face[] an uphill battle to obtain additional edu218
cational opportunities in prison.” Prison violence and a lack of
marketable skills are important factors during parole hearings,
and juvenile lifers who have not made efforts towards rehabili219
tation may be passed over for parole.
Juvenile lifers also have trouble remaining hopeful, and often lose touch with friends and family throughout their prison
220
sentences. Most prisoners serving long sentences, adults and
221
juveniles alike, “lose social support and family connections.”
For juvenile prisoners, who likely rely on their friends and fam214. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do To Provide a
Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and
Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310, 337 (2012); Levick & Schwartz, supra
note 117, at 394.
215. See, e.g., Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 338 (discussing juveniles
serving time in a Florida prison).
216. Id. at 337.
217. Id.
218. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES:
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 68
(2005),
available
at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
therestoftheirlives.pdf; see also id. at 5 (“[Juvenile lifers] are denied educational, vocational, and other programs to develop their minds and skills because access to those programs is typically restricted to prisoners who will
someday be released, and for whom rehabilitation therefore remains a goal.”);
Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 340 (“Confronted with limited resources,
prisons often give enrollment preference for education, vocational, and other
services to inmates with shorter sentences.”); Levick & Schwartz, supra note
117, at 398 (explaining how juvenile lifers are systematically excluded from
educational and vocational programs).
219. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013); Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at
394, 409; Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195.
220. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61;
Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 338.
221. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61.
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ily more than adult prisoners, these relationship losses could be
222
especially detrimental. Additionally, not only will losing relationships with loved ones hurt juvenile lifers emotionally, it
could hurt their chances for parole. In parole hearings judges
223
look at a prisoner’s likelihood for rehabilitation, and having
someone to provide living arrangements or a job is useful when
convincing a judge that a prisoner will have no problem re224
entering society. As juvenile lifers begin to face parole boards
(based on either a re-sentencing hearing or an automatic lesser
sentence) it is unclear if these offenders will even qualify for
225
parole because of the detrimental effects of prison. It is possible that adult juvenile lifers granted lower sentences post226
Miller will not realize tangible justice in the form of freedom.
Miller is retroactive, at least in some states, and many juvenile lifers will have their mandatory life without parole sen227
tences re-considered. States keeping discretionary life without parole sentences for juveniles must re-sentence juvenile
lifers, taking into account Miller’s youthfulness factors—
including transitory personality—before making sentencing de228
cisions. Taking transitory personality into account creates a
paradox of treating adults like children, because juvenile lifers’
229
have grown up and no longer have transitory personalities.
So far, courts conducting re-sentencing hearings have not
solved this paradox, and focus more on the juvenile lifer’s reha230
bilitation efforts rather than the actual crime. Some states
are avoiding the paradox of treating adults like children altogether, by precluding any life without parole sentences for ju222. Id. (“The difference for youth offenders serving life without parole is
that they are likely to be much more dependent on family relationships than
older inmates and may suffer these losses at an earlier age, causing them to
endure their loss longer than other inmates.”).
223. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19; Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394;
Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195.
224. For example, in juvenile lifer Ragland’s re-sentencing hearing described in State v. Ragland, testimony about Ragland’s ability to get a job from
a friend and live with his brother upon release were key. 836 N.W.2d 107,
112–13 (Iowa 2013).
225. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 394–95.
226. See id.
227. See, e.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012);
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122; Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1
N.E.3d 270, 281–82 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702–03 (Miss.
2013) (en banc).
228. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
229. See supra notes 152–171 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112–13.
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veniles and automatically commuting juvenile lifers’ sentenc231
es, but most states are electing to keep discretionary life
without parole sentences for juveniles and must solve the para232
dox. Finally, even if courts manage to re-sentence juvenile lifers, or states commute juvenile lifers’ sentences, many offenders may never receive parole because of the inherent difficulties
233
involved in serving prison sentences as a juvenile lifer.
III. SENTENCING/PAROLE HYBRID HEARINGS: A
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
Because new sentencing hearings face the paradox of treat234
ing adults like children and may lead to absurd results, and
because not all states preclude life without parole for juve235
niles, many adult juvenile lifers will face difficulties when
pursuing post-Miller justice. Section A of this Part argues that
complete re-sentencing hearings are untenable because completely adhering to Miller’s requirements is unpractical for
many juvenile lifers seeking new sentences, and courts should
instead conduct “hybrid hearings.” Hybrid hearings will examine the relevant youthfulness characteristics from Miller, but
will avoid the paradox of treating adults like children by also
focusing on the juvenile lifers’ current characteristics and their
chances for rehabilitation. Section B of this Part addresses
some problems with hybrid hearings, but argues that these
hearings are still the most practical way for adult juvenile lifers to attain Miller justice.
A. AVOIDING THE PARADOX: “HYBRID HEARINGS”
In theory, new sentencing hearings for juvenile lifers
should focus on the sentence warranted for the crime, not on
the events that transpired between imposition of mandatory
236
life without parole and the present. If courts completely adhere to Miller’s requirements when conducting new sentencing
231. See H.R. 0023, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); Diatchenko, 1
N.E.3d at 283–85; Associated Press, supra note 197.
232. See sources cited supra note 211.
233. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 393–94.
234. See supra notes 152–70 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part II.B.2.
236. Courts applying retroactivity have remanded for new sentencing trials
in accord with Miller, and have not given any instructions to address the offender’s current likelihood for rehabilitation. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 426
S.W.3d 906, 911 (Ark. 2013) (instructing the court “to hold a sentencing hearing where Jackson may present Miller evidence”).
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hearings for adult juvenile lifers, they must look at the offender
at the time of the crime, and address youthfulness characteris237
tics. Courts must ask the question: Does the offender’s behavior and life circumstances suggest that this crime was a simple
youthful indiscretion, or is it evidence of a depraved personali238
ty? As explained above, this question’s answer could some239
times lead to absurd results. Even in situations that do not
240
lead to absurd results, addressing transitory personality may
be moot, and courts (federal courts at least) should not waste
241
judicial resources addressing moot issues.
This Note proposes a solution that avoids mootness and
absurd results: “hybrid hearings.” Hybrid hearings combine
sentencing and parole hearings. These hearings will allow
courts to focus on a juvenile lifer’s youthfulness characteristics
at the time of the crime, but also the offender’s current personality. The district court hearing approved in State v. Ragland,
discussed above, offers a good example for how these hearings
242
could be conducted. A juvenile lifer could present evidence
that his or her youthfulness constitutes diminished culpability
243
for the crime committed. Some examples include demonstrat244
ing peer pressure by a group of friends, simply being in the

237. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“[W]e require it to
take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”).
238. See id.
239. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
240. It is possible that a juvenile lifer’s personality has not drastically
changed and that a court would end up with a result that makes sense. For
example, a juvenile who was minimally involved in his or her crime and was
heavily influenced by peers might now demonstrate maturity and a strong
possibility for rehabilitation.
241. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316–20 (1974) (per curiam)
(explaining that federal courts cannot decide moot issues). Even if state courts
are not precluded from considering moot issues, one could imagine that it
would be uncomfortable for a court and/or offender to discuss issues that are
no longer relevant.
242. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 112–13 (Iowa 2013).
243. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (stating that juveniles have “diminished culpability”).
244. See, e.g., id. at 2468 (“To be sure, Jackson learned on the way to the
video store that his friend Shields was carrying a gun, but his age could well
have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness
to walk away at that point.”); Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark.
2004) (stating that Jackson only found out that his friend had a gun on the
way to the robbery).
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245

wrong place at the wrong time, living in a violent environ246
ment, proving that the offender was not the primary actor in
247
248
the crime, or showing that the offender acted on impulse.
In addition to presenting youthfulness evidence to prove
diminished culpability for the crime, the juvenile lifer could also demonstrate rehabilitation. This would allow the important
transitory personality characteristic from Miller to come in ex
post. By demonstrating rehabilitation, the offender can prove
his or her actions were evidence of a transitory personality, rather than a permanently depraved personality. Evidence that
could prove transitory personality/rehabilitation would be simi249
lar to evidence typically presented in parole hearings. Some
250
examples are: guaranteed job upon release, having a place to
251
252
live upon release, marketable skills acquired in prison,
253
demonstrating remorse for the crime, or clean prison rec254
ords.
Examining youthfulness characteristics at the time of the
crime alongside current personality characteristics avoids ab245. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasizing that Jackson did not
even shoot the victim); Ragland, 326 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting Ragland’s accomplice’s statement that Ragland “was unlucky to be with [him] that night,
not the other way around”).
246. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (commenting that both Jackson’s
mother and his grandmother had previously shot people); id. at 2462, 2469
(explaining that Miller attempted suicide as a child, his stepfather physically
abused him, and his mother neglected him); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112
(quoting Ragland’s accomplice’s statement that the “time and place” in which
the boys grew up influenced their actions).
247. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasizing that Jackson did not
even shoot the victim).
248. See, e.g., id. at 2462, 2469 (stating that Miller committed his crime
while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and that Miller grabbed a
baseball bat after the victim grabbed him by the throat).
249. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18–19 (2013); Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195.
250. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 112 (stating that a businessman
“testified he would gladly hire Ragland upon release from prison”).
251. See, e.g., id. (stating that Ragland’s brother testified that “living arrangements” would be “in place” upon Ragland’s release).
252. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 403 (“Many state codes explicitly require parole boards to use rehabilitation as the central benchmark
for parole decisions.”).
253. See, e.g., Ragland, 836 N.W. 2d at 112 (quoting Ragland’s brother’s
statement that Ragland had built a relationship with the victim’s brother);
Lifer Parole Process, supra note 195 (listing “signs of remorse” as a factor tending to indicate an inmate’s suitability for parole in California).
254. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 (“[T]he Commission must determine that the
prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution or institutions
in which he has been confined . . . .”).
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surd results and potential mootness problems. The court would
no longer look at the crime in a vacuum, examining character255
istics that may no longer be relevant to the offender. If the
juvenile’s crime was so extreme that a court might find it evidence of a depraved personality, but the offender currently
demonstrates maturity, a court would not come to the absurd
result of keeping the life without parole sentence when it is no
256
longer warranted. Hybrid hearings are a practical solution
that can bring juvenile lifers the justice they deserve postMiller.
B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH HYBRID HEARINGS
Even though hybrid hearings solve the paradox of treating
adults like children, there are several problems with these
hearings that should be addressed. One problem with hybrid
hearings is that, as explained above, juveniles serving life
257
without parole sentences are often disadvantaged in prison.
These offenders may not receive the benefit of educational and
vocational programs, which incidentally may make it less likely
258
that the offender will have a job upon release. Additionally,
these offenders entered prison at a tumultuous time in their
lives without any hope of release, and may have acted violently
259
as a result. Some offenders may have violent prison records,
not because they have depraved personalities, but because they
260
had no incentive to act otherwise. Also, many juvenile lifers
may not have friends and family willing to provide living arrangements upon release, because juvenile offenders serving
261
life sentences are less likely to maintain relationships. All of
these unfortunate consequences of serving long prison sentences could severely disadvantage juvenile lifers in hybrid hearings. Courts conducting hybrid hearings should keep these
facts in mind, and understand that even if a prisoner has diffi-

255. See supra notes 152–171 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part II.C.
258. Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 340 (“Confronted with limited resources, prisons often give enrollment preference for education, vocational,
and other services to inmates with shorter sentences.”); Levick & Schwartz,
supra note 117, at 398 (explaining how juvenile lifers are systematically excluded from educational and vocational programs).
259. Glynn & Vila, supra note 214, at 337.
260. Id.
261. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 61.
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culty proving rehabilitation it may not mean that there is no
hope for the offender.
Another problem with hybrid hearings is that they likely
will favor juvenile lifers with more resources. Juvenile lifers
coming from well-off families or backgrounds likely will have
262
more job and living options upon release. These offenders
may have had resources entering prison that allowed them to
enter educational programs other juvenile lifers were not of263
fered. Favoring juvenile lifers with more resources is problematic because it could perpetuate the cycle of violence in low264
income populations. Courts should weigh these factors when
conducting hybrid hearings, and should keep class status in
mind when making decisions.
A third problem with hybrid hearings is that they are not a
concrete solution, and are subject to the court’s discretion.
Judges’ solutions could vary vastly from case to case, and some
juvenile lifers may end up with better results than others. Unfortunately, this is a problem with any functional solution, and
265
it is not easily resolved. Still, hybrid hearings allow flexibility
266
to address each juvenile lifer’s individual circumstances. Also,
since many states keep life without parole as a possible sen267
tence for juvenile lifers, a functional solution ensures that
these offenders actually receive Miller justice.
262. Cf. Paul Street, Race, Prison, and Poverty, HIST. IS A WEAPON,
http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/streeracpripov.html (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014) (“For those [parolees] with earnings, average annual wages were
exceedingly low and differed significantly by race: white former inmates averaged $7,880 per year and Blacks made just $4,762.”).
263. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 218, at 69
(“Post-secondary education is only available to youth offenders serving life
without parole if someone can pay the course fees, which tend to be beyond the
means of most offenders’ families.”).
264. See generally Victor Eugene Flango & Edgar L. Sherbenou, Poverty,
Urbanization, and Crime, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 331, 340 (1977) (finding that urbanization and poverty correlate with crime).
265. Professor Barry Feld’s “youth discount” could be one alternative. See
Feld, supra note 24, at 316. The “youth discount” would categorically mitigate
juvenile sentences rather than require individualized sentencing. Id. While
this is a practical solution, it would not work for states that still want to sentence some juveniles to life without parole. See, e.g., S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Ass.
(Del. 2013).
266. Miller requires individualized sentencing hearings before sentencing
juveniles to harsh penalties. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475
(2012).
267. See, e.g., Del. S.B. 9 (removing mandatory life without parole, but retaining life without parole as a maximum sentence for juveniles convicted of
first-degree murder).

BOONE_4fmt

1194

1/6/2015 3:10 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1159

CONCLUSION
Miller v. Alabama provides juvenile lifers an opportunity
for justice, and a chance to receive new sentences that take juveniles’ diminished culpability into account. Unfortunately,
adult juvenile lifers may face difficulties when seeking the benefit of Miller. New sentencing hearings for juvenile lifers that
have grown up must address the paradox of treating adults like
children, and cannot implement the transitory personality
characteristic—an important principle in Miller—without risking addressing a moot issue or ending up with an absurd result.
Courts applying Miller retroactively have not addressed this
problem, or have conducted sentencing hearings that do not
consider transitory personality and other youthfulness characteristics. Additionally, many states still keep life without parole
as a possible sentence for some juvenile offenders, so most
adult juvenile lifers’ cannot simply have their sentences commuted.
Complete sentencing hearings are not the correct route for
courts when re-sentencing adult juvenile lifers. Courts should
use “hybrid hearings” that mix elements of sentencing and parole hearings. Hybrid hearings will allow courts to address
youthfulness characteristics as related to the crime committed,
as well as the offender’s current personality and likelihood for
rehabilitation. Addressing the adult juvenile lifer’s current personality allows courts to consider transitory personality ex post.
Offenders can present evidence demonstrating that the crime
committed only indicated a transitory personality, not a permanently depraved character. Hybrid hearings would solve the
paradox of treating adults like children while staying true to
the central principles in Miller. Most importantly, hybrid hearings will allow juvenile lifers to receive tangible post-Miller justice.

